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ABSTRACT
The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, which essentially federalizes all multi-state class-
action cases, has introduced the class-action bar, and necessarily the judiciary, to myriad 
substantive and procedural issues never before envisioned in class-action litigation’s history.  
While some of these issues have already surfaced, many others haven’t but will as newly 
federalized multi-state class-action lawsuits move through litigation to the class certification 
stage.  A major and unavoidable issue involves whether federal judges, when deciding multi-
state claims’ class certification under Federal Rule 23, may consider well-developed, state class-
action jurisprudence applying a single state’s substantive law or whether doing so violates the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s Erie Doctrine.  My Article, after analyzing federal choice-of-law 
jurisprudence and Erie and its progeny, concludes that federal courts may consider state class-
action jurisprudence applying a single state’s substantive law when deciding class certification 
under Federal Rule 23 and that doing so actually honors Erie’s mandate, albeit in an 
unanticipated manner.  My Article provides guidance to the class-action bar and the judiciary, as 
they will undoubtedly recognize this issue and its significance when briefing, arguing, and 
deciding class certification of multi-state, class-action lawsuits. 
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2I. INTRODUCTION 
The Class Action Fairness Act of 20051 undoubtedly created more issues than it 
answered.2 By federalizing essentially all interstate class-action lawsuits,3 CAFA introduced 
multiple legal, jurisdictional, and other theoretical challenges that the bench and bar will have to 
work through together, hopefully to sensible resolutions.  One of these challenges concerns 
whether federal judges may rely on well-developed, state class-action jurisprudence to decide 
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1 28 U.S.C. §1332(d) (2005). 
2 For example, by way of unintended consequences, federal court antitrust filings have already begun to increase 
because price-fixed products’ indirect purchasers can’t bring lawsuits under the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §4 (2005), 
for violating the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §1 (2005), yet can make claims under certain states’ antitrust or consumer-
fraud statutes, see Daniel R. Karon, “Your Honor, Tear Down That Illinois Brick Wall!”  The National Movement 
Toward Indirect Purchaser Antitrust Standing and Consumer Justice, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1351, 1401 (2004) 
(Arguing that “thirty-nine (and arguably as many as forty-four) states grant indirect purchasers standing, either on 
their own or through their attorneys general as parens patriae, to pursue price fixing claims.”), and common law.  
See Daniel R. Karon, Undoing the Otherwise Perfect Crime – Applying Unjust Enrichment to Consumer Price-
Fixing Claims, __ W. VA. L. REV. ___,  ___ (2006) (Arguing that, in all states, “unjust enrichment [is] an entirely 
viable, yet often underutilized, theory for pursuing consumer price-fixing claims.”).  Indirect purchasers typically 
filed claims in state court, where only complete diversity jurisdiction existed as defendants’ basis for removal to 
federal court.  But CAFA only requires minimal diversity and permits defendants to aggregate damages.  See infra 
Part II.  Therefore, antitrust litigation that would have remained in state court pre-CAFA must now be filed in 
federal court.  
 Also, where “two-thirds or more of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate, and the 
primary defendants, are citizens of the State in which the action was originally filed,” 28 U.S.C. §1332(d)(4)(B) 
(2005), the federal court must decline jurisdiction.  But to properly rebut this threshold, a defendant must prove that 
the majority of the class is outside the state, which requires an empirical class analysis, such as defendant producing 
its customer lists pre-class certification – not a welcome undertaking for any defendant. 
Finally, “[i]f a proposed settlement in a class action provides for a recovery of coupons to a class member, 
the portion of any attorney’s fee award to class counsel that is attributable to the award of the coupons shall be based 
on the value to class members of the coupons that are redeemed.”  28 U.S.C. §1712(a).  Accordingly, plaintiffs’ 
counsel have already become, naturally, less inclined to resolve class-action lawsuits for coupons and have instead 
begun insisting on money damages – a result that defendants, while believing favorable during the pre-CAFA 
debate, have, in some situations, begun to regret. 
3 According to CAFA: 
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action in which the matter in controversy 
exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is a class action in which –  
 (A)  any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant; 
 (B)  any member of a class of plaintiffs is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of a foreign state and 
any defendant is a citizen of a State; or 
(C)  any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State and any defendant is a foreign state or a 
citizen or subject of a foreign state.  28 U.S.C. §1332(d)(2)(A)-(C) (2005). 
3class certification under Federal Rule 23 when considering multi-state, class-action lawsuits 
alleging a single state law’s substantive application.   
Federal courts rarely conducted these difficult, multi-state, substantive-law analyses pre-
CAFA, and denying federal courts the ability to invoke years of well-developed, state-court 
jurisprudence on this challenging subject post-CAFA arguably forces federal courts to decide 
multi-state class certification alleging a single state law’s substantive application from a largely 
blank legal slate.  But even though federal courts hearing diversity-jurisdiction cases regularly 
apply state substantive law,4 this particular state-law issue is curious in that it involves a 
procedural overlay – Federal Rule 23 – that affects (or does it?) federal courts’ otherwise 
traditional ability to invoke state substantive law and to conduct multi-state class-certification 
analyses pursuant to it.  Despite the admittedly, if not predominantly, procedural nature of a 
Federal Rule 23 class-certification analysis, this Article will argue that, consistent with U.S. 
Supreme Court doctrine – albeit never intended to be so invoked – federal courts may draw upon 
state-law decisions when deciding multi-state class certification alleging a single state law’s 
substantive application. 
 
II.   CAFA AND ITS EFFECT ON TRADITIONAL, INTERSTATE CLASS-ACTION,  
SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION 
CAFA fundamentally changed federal subject-matter jurisdictional doctrine as it relates 
to diversity-based (i.e., interstate) class-action claims.  Before CAFA, which amended 28 U.S.C. 
§1332 (the federal diversity-jurisdiction statute) to create federal jurisdiction for claims 
involving minimal diversity5 and amounts in controversy that, individually, total less than 
 
4 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution 
or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State.”). 
5 28 U.S.C. §1332(d)(2)(A) (2005). 
4$75,000,6 federal courts weren’t permitted to aggregate class members’ claims to establish the 
jurisdictional minimum.   
In Snyder v. Harris,7 a class-action shareholder lawsuit,8 the U.S. Supreme Court 
explained that “[w]hen two or more plaintiffs, having separate and distinct demands, unite for 
convenience and economy in a single suit, it is essential that the demand of each be of the 
requisite jurisdictional amount. . . .”9 The Snyder Court based its ruling on two considerations.  
First, the Court sensed that a contrary holding would wreak havoc on the federal judiciary’s 
workload.10 Second, it believed that Congress had come to rely on the Court’s interpretation in 
continually re-enacting §1332’s amount-in-controversy threshold.11 
Harkening back to Snyder, the Court, in Zahn v. International Paper Co.,12 later 
elucidated that “class actions involving plaintiffs with separate and distinct claims were subject 
to the usual rule that a federal district court can assume jurisdiction over only those plaintiffs 
presenting claims exceeding the $10,00013 minimum specified in §1332[, and that a]ggregation 
of claims was impermissible. . . .14 Instead, “[e]ach plaintiff in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action must 
satisfy the jurisdictional amount, and any plaintiff who does not must be dismissed from the 
 
6 Id. at §1332(d)(2)(C). 
7 394 U.S. 332 (1969). 
8 Id. at 333 (Plaintiff “brought suit against members of the company’s board of directors alleging that they had sold 
their shares of the company’s stock for an amount far in excess of its fair market value, [and] that this excess 
represented [an illegal] payment to these particular directors. . . .”). 
9 Id. at 336 (citing Troy Bank v. G.A. Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39, 40 (1911)). 
10 Id. at 340 (“The expansion of the federal caseload could be most noticeable in class actions brought on the basis 
of diversity of citizenship. . . .”).   
11 Id. at 339 (“To overrule the aggregation doctrine at this late date would run counter to the congressional purpose 
in steadily increasing through the years the jurisdictional amount requirement.”).  See also Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 
414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973) (“We have no good reason to disagree with . . . the historic construction of the 
jurisdictional statutes, left undisturbed by Congress over these many years.”). 
12 414 U.S. 291 (1973). 
13 On May 18, 1989, Congress amended §1332’s jurisdictional-minimum requirement from $10,000 to $50,000, and 
on January 17 1997, amended it from $50,000 to $75,000. 
14 Zahn, supra note 12, at 299. 
5case. . . .”15 And while the Zahn Court never expressly mentioned supplemental jurisdiction (or 
its antecedents, pendent and ancillary jurisdiction), the Court’s language also effectively 
precluded district courts from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over class members with (at 
least arguably) less than $75,000 in damages.16 Accordingly, district courts couldn’t 
automatically consider absent class members’ claims even if the named plaintiff’s claimed 
damages may have satisfied the minimum-jurisdictional requirement.17 
15 Id. at 301.  Interestingly, though, the Court excused unnamed plaintiffs from satisfying §1332’s “diversity of 
citizenship” requirement.  See Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 225 U.S. 356, 366 (1921) (“The intervention of 
the Indiana citizens in the [class-action] suit [against defendants who were Indiana citizens] would not have defeated 
the [district court’s diversity] jurisdiction. . . .”).  The Court never explained why it treated §1332’s diversity-of-
citizenship and amount-in-controversy requirements differently, other than to suggest that allowing unnamed 
plaintiffs to evade both requirements would open the federal litigation floodgates – a result the federal courts surely 
wanted to avoid but must now face.  See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 340 (1969) (“To allow aggregation of 
claims where only one member of the entire class is of diverse citizenship could transfer into the federal courts 
numerous local controversies involving exclusively questions of state law.”). 
16 See Zahn, supra note 12, at 301 (“Any plaintiff without the jurisdictional amount must be dismissed from the 
case, even though others allege jurisdictionally sufficient claims.”). 
17 According to some federal courts, 28 U.S.C. §1367 (2005), which Congress enacted in 1990 and which provides 
that “the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the 
action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the 
United States Constitution,” id. at §1367(a), “overruled the Zahn and required district courts to aggregate the claims 
of class members to calculate the amount in controversy for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. . . .”  Dawalt v. 
Purdue Pharmaceuticals L.P., 397 F.3d 392, 396 (6th Cir. 2005).  See also State Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Yates, 391 F.3d 
577, 580 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he force of the argument that §1367 overrules Zahn is untouched by the presence of 
multiple defendants unless we adopt the illogical (indeed, absurd) conclusion that §1367 overrules Zahn only in 
single defendant cases.”); Rosmer v. Pfizer, Inc., 263 F.3d 110, 114-15 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[S]ince the pendent claims 
of the absent class members raise similar questions of law and fact to [Plaintiff’s] claim, they are necessarily a ‘part 
of the same case or controversy.’  . . . Therefore, the district court has supplemental jurisdiction over the other 
claims [pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1367(a)].”); Stromberg Metal Works v. Press Mechanical, Inc., 77 F.3d 928, 931 (7th 
Cir. 1996) (“If §1367(a) allows suit by a pendent plaintiff who meets the jurisdictional amount but not the diversity 
requirement, it also allows suit by a pendent plaintiff who satisfies the diversity requirement but not the 
jurisdictional amount.”); In re Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d 524, 528 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The statute's first section vests 
federal courts with the power to hear supplemental claims generally, subject to limited exceptions set forth in the 
statute's second section. Class actions are not among the enumerated exceptions.”).  Other courts, as described, 
believed that §1367 didn’t overrule Zahn and that §1332’s requirement that all class members’ claims meet the 
jurisdictional minimum remained the rule. See Trimble v. Asarco, Inc., 232 F.3d 946, 962 (8th Cir. 2000) 
(“Congress in §1367(a) expressly excepted claims brought under §1332 and its well-understood definition of ‘matter 
in controversy.’”); Meritcare Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214, 218 (3rd Cir. 1998) ([T]he claims of 
those plaintiffs who fail to meet the amount in controversy must be remanded.”); Leonhardt v. Western Sugar Co., 
160 F.3d 631, 640 (10th Cir. 1998) (“. . . Congress in §1367(a) expressly excepted claims brought under §1332 and 
its well-understood definition of ‘matter in controversy.’”).  The Supreme Court, albeit after CAFA’s enactment, 
ultimately confirmed that §1367 overruled Zahn and that “interpreting §1367 to foreclose supplemental jurisdiction 
over plaintiffs in diversity cases who [did] not meet the minimum amount in controversy [was] inconsistent with the 
text, read in light of other statutory provisions and our established jurisprudence.”  Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah 
Servs., __ U.S. __, 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2625 (2005).   
6But believing that “[c]lass-actions [were long being] manipulated for personal gain,”18 
and that “[l]awyers who represent plaintiffs from multiple states [were] shop[ping] around for 
the state court where they expect[ed] to win the most money,”19 on February 10, 2005, Congress 
passed CAFA, and on February 18, 2005, President Bush signed CAFA into law.  CAFA 
amended §1332 and abrogated Zahn, thus creating original federal-court jurisdiction for class-
action claims that exceed $5,000,000 in potential aggregate damages.20 Accordingly, plaintiffs 
can no longer pursue multi-state, class-action cases in state courts – assuming their claims 
involve any meaningful classwide damages – but must instead file their lawsuits in federal court.  
In this manner, at least as contemplated by President Bush and Congress, class-action defendants 
will be treated more fairly; although, not surprisingly, debate raged, and still rages, concerning 
the soundness of this belief and of CAFA’s fairness.21 But regardless of this debate’s eventual 
 
18 The White House, President Signs Class-Action Fairness Act of 2005 (visited Dec. 12, 2005) 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050218-11.html>. 
19 Id. 
20 28 U.S.C. §1332(d)(2)(A) (2005).  See also Exxon, supra note 17, at 2627-28 (“[CAFA] abrogates the rule against 
aggregating claims, a rule this Court recognized in Ben-Hur and reaffirmed in Zahn.”). And while CAFA also 
makes clear that, to satisfy §1332’s diversity requirement, only “minimal diversity is required,” meaning that only 
one class member need be a citizen of a different state from any defendant, even pre-CAFA it was “well-settled that 
a class action may satisfy §1332 if there [was] diversity only between the representative plaintiffs and the 
defendants.”  United States ex rel. Sero v. Preiser, 506 F.2d 1115, 1129 (2d Cir. 1974) (citing Ben Hur, 225 U.S. at 
366).  In this manner, CAFA’s new “minimum diversity” requirement doesn’t greatly impact the federal-
jurisdictional analysis since minimum diversity had effectively been the standard beforehand. 
21 Fierce public debate preceded CAFA’s enactment, with numerous public officials and consumer groups voicing 
strident opposition.  According to House Democratic Leader, Nancy Pelosi, “[CAFA], which discourages class 
action lawsuits, is far from fair.  It is instead another way for Republicans to align themselves with special interests 
at the expense of American consumers and the justice system.”  The People Over Profits Action Network, From 
House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi (on file with author).  Speaker Pelosi added her belief that “Republicans 
[were] bringing to the floor . . . a payback to big business at the expense of consumers[, and that t]he Republican 
agenda is to ensure that some Americans do not get their day in court.”  Id.  Considering that “federal courts are 
already overwhelmed by the large number of criminal drug cases and immigration case [and] do not have the 
resources to handle complex issues of state law,” ATLA Press Room, Don’t Let Class Action “Reform” Deny 
Justice to Consumers (visited Feb. 4, 2005) 
<http://www.atla.org/ConsumerMediaResources/Tier3/press_room/FACTS/classactions/SameOldStory_2005>, in 
2003 Chief Justice William Rehnquist and the Judicial Conference of the United States sent a letter to the Senate 
Judiciary Committee expressing their concerns about CAFA and reiterating their opposition to many of its 
jurisdictional provisions, ATLA Press Room, Federal Judicial Conference Opposed Federalizing Class Actions 
(visited Feb. 4, 2005) <http://www.atla.org/homepage/fjc.aspx>, explaining that CAFA “would add substantially to 
the work load of the federal courts and is inconsistent with principles of federalism.”  NACA, What the Experts are 
7outcome, if any, CAFA’s enactment effectively ended the days of filing multi-state, class-action 
lawsuits in state courts.   
 
III.   THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROBLEM CAFA CREATED 
Having explained CAFA’s contours and the way it fundamentally changed federal-
diversity jurisdiction, an example will help elucidate the substantive-procedural/choice-of-law 
issue that CAFA inadvertently created.  Let’s return to the pre-CAFA (or “de-CAFA-nated”) 
world, where multi-state, class-action cases were routinely filed in state courts.22 Fully 
 
Saying About the So-Called ‘Class Action Fairness Act’” (on file with author).  The Conference of Chief Justices, 
which represents the interests of state supreme courts, also “came out against the class action ‘reform’ legislation,” 
ATLA Press Room, Conference of Chief Justices Weighs Against Class Action “Reform” Legislation (visited Feb. 
4, 2005) <http://www.atla.org/homepage/ccj.aspx>, explaining that they saw “no hard evidence of the inability of 
state judicial systems to hear and decide fairly class actions brought in state courts,” and expressing their belief that 
“state courts and state legislatures should be responsible for correcting any problems (with class actions), and history 
has shown that will occur.”  NACA, What the Experts are Saying About the So-Called ‘Class Action Fairness Act’” 
(on file with author).  Multiple consumer groups also went on record in opposition to CAFA’s enactment, such as 
the ACLU, AFL-CIO, Coalition to Stop Gun Violence, Consumer Federation of America, Consumers Union, 
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, National Association of Consumer Advocates, National Consumer 
Law Center, NOW Legal Defense Fund, Public Citizen, Sierra Club, and United Steelworkers of America.  See 
ATLA Press Room, Public Interest Organizations Support Access to Justice – With Federal Courts Clogged, Class 
Actions Will Die (visited Feb. 4, 2005) 
<http://www.atla.org/ConsumerMediaResources/Tier3/pess_room/FACTS/classactions/Coalition for Justice>. Even 
the Los Angeles Times commented that “[w]hen corporate executives gush over any bill with the word ‘fairness’ in 
its title, consumers had best check their wallets,” A Failure of Fairness, L.A. TIMES, July 3, 2005, and the New York 
Times observed that CAFA “would move almost all major class-action lawsuits to overburdened federal courts from 
state courts [and that s]uch a shift is likely to delay or deny justice in numerous instances, and, ultimately, to dilute 
the impact of the strong consumer protection laws in many states.”  Class-Action Unfairness, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 
2004.      
22 See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d 657, 661 (Tex. 2004) (Nationwide class action 
“alleg[ing] that the affected computers, some thirty-seven models of Compaq Presario computers, contain defective 
FDCs, which control the transfer of data . . . between a computer’s memory and a floppy disk.”); Portwood v. Ford 
Motor Co., 183 Ill. 2d 459, 461 (1998) (Nationwide class action by “thousands of people who purchased Ford 
automobiles [who] sustained property damage as a result of collisions which occurred when the vehicles’ 
transmissions shifted from ‘park’ to ‘reverse’ without warning.”); Orman v. Charles Schwab & Co., 179 Ill. 2d 282, 
284 (1997) (Nationwide class action alleging that “defendants violated Illinois agency and/or contract law when they 
failed to remit to plaintiffs order flow payments received in executing plaintiffs’ securities transactions.”); Connick 
v. Suzuki Motor Co., 174 Ill. 2d 482, 511 (1996) (Nationwide class action alleging “that a defect in the Samurai’s 
design caused all of the vehicles to roll over during turns or evasive maneuvers.”); Washington Mut. Bank v. 
Superior Court, 24 Cal. 4th 906, 911 (2001) (Nationwide class-action where defendant bank was alleged to have 
“victimized its borrowers by systematically overcharging for the replacement insurance coverage and secretly 
profiting through cash commissions or in-kind services from the vendors of the replacement insurance.”); Discover 
Bank v. Superior Court, No. B161305, 2005 Cal. App. LEXIS 1875, at *2 (Dec. 7, 2005), rev’d as to whether 
Federal Arbitration Act preempted California law concerning unconscionability of class-action waivers and 
8understanding this practice requires first discussing the U.S. Supreme Court’s Phillips Petroleum 
v. Shutts23 decision, which plaintiffs’ class-action counsel regularly cite for the proposition that a 
court (formerly a state court) can, under appropriate circumstances, certify a multi-state class 
action under a single state’s substantive law.   
Shutts involved gas royalty owners’ claims against Philips Petroleum for delaying royalty 
payments.24 The royalty owners resided in all 50 states,25 but three of them, including Shutts, 
filed a class-action lawsuit in Kansas, where Shutts happened to live, alleging that Phillips had 
violated Kansas contract and equity law.   Plaintiffs argued that Kansas substantive law governed 
the entire class’ claims “notwithstanding that over 99% of the gas leases and some 97% of the 
plaintiffs . . . had no apparent connection to the State of Kansas except for th[e] lawsuit.”26 
Although Phillips argued that “the trial court should have looked to the laws of each State where 
the leases were located to determine, on the basis of conflict of laws principles, whether interest 
on the suspended royalties was recoverable, and at what rate,”27 the Kansas Supreme Court 
“stated that generally the law of the forum controlled all claims unless ‘compelling reasons’ 
existed to apply a different law.”28 Finding no compelling reasons, the court affirmed the trial 
court’s decision applying Kansas substantive law to the entire class’ claims.29 
classwide arbitration, 36 Cal. 4th 148 (2005) (“[N]ationwide class action against Discover Bank . . . alleging claims 
for breach of contract and violation of the Delaware Consumer Fraud Act.”); Renaissance Cruises, Inc. v. Glassman, 
738 So. 2d 436, 437 (Fla. 1999) (Nationwide class action “assert[ing] that [cruise line held] out [certain] charges as 
being wholly due to the ports, but then [kept] the money that [was] in excess of the actual port charges.”); State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 114 Cal. App. 4th 434, 438 (2003) (Nationwide class action by “[a] 
group of policyholders [who] contend[ed] that the insurance company’s board of directors did not pay the dividends 
it promised.”); Fink v. Ricoh Corp., 365 N.J. Super. 520, 531-33 (2003) (nationwide class action against camera 
manufacturer for allegedly misrepresenting certain camera’s features). 
23 472 U.S. 797 (1985). 
24 Id. at 799. 
25 Id.  
26 Id. at 814-15. 
27 Id. at 802-03. 
28 Id. at 803. 
29 Id. at 803, 816. 
9On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, Phillips argued that applying Kansas substantive 
law had “violated the constitutional limitations on choice of law mandated by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Full Faith and Credit Clause. . . .”30 Drawing upon 
its earlier Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague31 decision, which also involved a choice-of-law 
determination,32 the Court explained that “in many situations a state court may be free to apply 
one of several choices of law,”33 and it ruled that doing so in a class-action setting is appropriate 
so long as the law sought to be applied “is not in conflict with that of any other jurisdiction 
connected to th[e] suit,”34 or, if a conflict exists, the state whose law plaintiff seeks to apply has a 
“‘significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts’ to the claims asserted by each 
member of the plaintiff class . . . ‘creating state interests,’ in order to ensure that the choice of 
[one state’s] law is not arbitrary or unfair.”35 Considering Kansas’s “lack of ‘interest’ in claims 
unrelated to [Kansas, as well as] the substantive conflict with jurisdictions such as Texas,”36 the 
Court concluded that the “application of Kansas law to every claim in this case [was] sufficiently 
 
30 Id. at 816. 
31 449 U.S. 302 (1981). 
32 In Allstate, decedent, a motorcycle passenger, was killed in an automobile accident in Wisconsin.  Although 
decedent worked in Minnesota, he, the motorcycle operator, and the other driver lived in Wisconsin, as did 
decedent’s wife.  While neither the motorcycle operator nor the other driver held valid insurance, decedent held an 
Allstate policy covering his three automobiles.  Decedent’s policy contained an uninsured motorist clause insuring 
him against loss incurred from accidents with uninsured motorists that limited coverage to $15,000 for each 
automobile.  Following the accident, decedent’s wife relocated to Minnesota, married a Minnesota resident, and 
decedent’s estate filed suit in Minnesota seeking to stack the policy’s uninsured motorist coverage, which Minnesota 
law permitted but Wisconsin law did not.  Id. at 305.  Affirming the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision to apply 
Minnesota’s stacking law to decedent’s estate’s claim, the Court ruled explained that “Minnesota had a significant 
aggregation of contacts with the parties and the occurrence, creating state interests, such that application of its law 
was neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”  Id. at 320.  Accordingly, the Court believed “the choice of 
Minnesota law by the Minnesota Supreme Court did not violate the Due Process Clause or the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause.”  Id. 
33 Shutts, supra note 23, at 823. 
34 Id. at 816. 
35 Id. at 821 (citing Allstate, supra note 31, at 312-13). 
36 Id. at 822. 
10
arbitrary and unfair as to exceed constitutional limits,”37 and it refused to apply Kansas 
substantive law to the multi-state class members’ claims.38 
Given Shutts’ teachings, if a plaintiff (located anywhere, really), pre-CAFA, filed a multi-
state, class-action lawsuit against, say, an Ohio corporation in an Ohio state court for breach of 
contract, plaintiff’s theory for countering defendant’s “predominance” argument39 during the 
class-certification stage and for obtaining nationwide class certification would be that, under 
Shutts’ first prong, Ohio’s contract law doesn’t conflict with any other state’s contract law; 
therefore, no problem exists applying Ohio law to class members located in multiple states.40 On 
the other hand, if plaintiff’s lawsuit alleged that defendant had violated Ohio’s consumer-
protection act,41 plaintiff’s response to defendant’s predominance argument and theory for 
 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 823 (“We . . . reverse [the Kansas Supreme Court’s] judgment insofar as it held that Kansas law was 
applicable to all of the transactions which it sought to adjudicate.”). 
39 According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), when alleging a class-action claim for money damages, 
one of the multiple requirements that a plaintiff must prove to a court’s satisfaction to obtain class certification is 
that “the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting 
only individual members. . . .”  (Emphasis added.)  Generally referred to as Rule 23’s “predominance requirement,” 
“[t]he Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant 
adjudication by representation.”  Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997).  As a practical matter, “[i]n 
order to meet the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3), a plaintiff must establish that ‘the issues in the class 
action that are subject to generalized proof, and thus applicable to the class as a whole, . . . predominate over those 
issues that are subject only to individualized proof.’”  In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 
136 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Rutstein v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 211 F.3d 1228, 1233 (11th Cir. 2000)).  
Importantly, “[t]he predominance requirement calls only for predominance, not exclusivity, of common questions.”  
Shelter Realty Corp. v. Allied Maintenance Corp., 75 F.R.D. 34, 37 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
40 See, e.g., Stetser v. TAP Pharmaceutical Prods. Inc., 165 N.C. App. 1, 17 (2004) (Explaining that “[t]he trial 
court’s application of North Carolina law to a nationwide plaintiff class will pass constitutional muster only if the 
substantive laws of each of these states does not materially differ from North Carolina’s law on plaintiffs’ claims.”); 
Microsoft Corp. v. Manning, 914 S.W.2d 602, 616 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (Affirming multi-state class certification 
under Texas law, explaining that “[n]o one will be injured in applying Texas law . . . if it is not in conflict with that 
of any other jurisdiction connected to this suit.”); Delgozzo v. Kenny, 266 N.J. Super. 169, 192 (1993) (Reversing 
order denying certification of a multi-state fraud and fraudulent concealment class-action claim under New Jersey 
law, explaining that “[t]he additional problems with possible multi-state consumer fraud or other statutory claims 
raise manageable questions.  The problems inherent in certifying a class presenting conflict of laws issues are not 
unsurmountable [sic]. . . .”). 
41 Under some states’ consumer-protection laws, the plaintiff must be a state resident for the statute to apply.  See 
e.g., Avery v. State Farm Ins. Co., No. 91494, 2005 Ill. LEXIS 959, at *133 (Aug., 18 2005) (“We conclude, 
therefore, that the out-of-state plaintiffs in this case have no cognizable cause of action under the Consumer Fraud 
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obtaining nationwide class certification would be that, under Shutts’ second prong, applying 
Ohio substantive law – here, Ohio’s consumer-protection act – neither violates due process nor is 
fundamentally unfair because defendant is headquartered in Ohio, defendant’s scheme was 
hatched and implemented in Ohio, defendant profited from its fraud in Ohio, and so on.42 
Importantly (and germane to this Article), when making either argument, plaintiff would invoke 
all Ohio state-court, class-action decisions applying Ohio substantive law to multi-state classes.  
For defendant’s part, it would cite all Ohio state-court, class-action decisions refusing to apply 
Ohio substantive law to multi-state classes.   
But in today’s CAFA-nated world, plaintiff’s multi-state, class-action complaint, if filed 
in Ohio state court, would be immediately removed to federal court,43 unless plaintiff originally 
 
Act.”); Goshen v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 774 N.E.2d 1190, 1195 (N.Y. 2002) (“[T]o qualify as a prohibited act under 
the statute, the deception of a consumer must occur in New York.”). 
42 See, e.g., Renaissance Cruises, Inc. v. Glassman, 738 So. 2d 436, 439 (Fla. Ct. App. 1999) (Affirming class 
certification under Florida consumer-protection law where “[t]he trial court found that Florida had significant 
connections, [such as a]ppellant’s principal place of business [was] in Florida, . . . appellant’s U.S. business 
operations [were] controlled and carried out from [Florida,] any overages were kept by appellant in Fort 
Lauderdale[, thus] indicati[ng] the parties’ mutual expectation that Florida law would apply. . . . .”); Gordon v. 
Boden, 224 Ill. App. 3d 195, 202 (1991) (Explaining that “if the trial court found that Illinois ha[d] significant 
contact to the claims asserted by each class member, the court could apply Illinois substantive law to this multi-state 
class action[, and that t]his finding would ensure that the application of Illinois law [was] neither arbitrary nor 
unfair.”). 
43 According to 28 U.S.C. §1441, “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United 
States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the 
United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.”   Furthermore, 
according to CAFA, “[t]he amendments made by this Act shall apply to any civil action commenced on or after the 
date of enactment of this Act[, February 18, 2005].”  109 P.L. 109-2, §9, 119 Stat. 14 (2005). Consequently, since 
CAFA’s enactment, defendants have routinely begun removing state-court, class-action cases to federal court where 
original jurisdiction, pursuant to CAFA, either does or is claimed to exist.  See, e.g., Natale v. Pfizer, Inc., 424 F.3d 
43, 44 (1st Cir. 2005) (Affirming district court’s remand order where defendant removed plaintiff’s pre-CAFA 
lawsuit, explaining that a state lawsuit “commences” when it begins in state court, not when the defendant removes 
it to federal court.); Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 447 (7th Cir. 2005) (Reversing district 
court’s order denying remand to state court following removal under CAFA where plaintiff’s “suit was commenced 
after February 18, 2005, the Act’s effective date.”); Bush v. Cheaptickets, Inc., 425 F.3d 683, 684 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(Affirming district court’s order remanding case to state court following removal under CAFA because “[b]y its own 
terms, the Act became effective for all actions that ‘commenced on or after’ February 18, 2005.”); Dinkel v. GMC, 
No. 05-190-P-H, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27237, at *7 (D. Maine Nov. 9, 2005) (Denying plaintiff’s motion for 
remand since plaintiff’s lawsuit, in which he failed to serve defendants all defendants within 90 days of his pre-
CAFA complaint’s filing, was not considered as having “commenced” pre-CAFA:  “Under Kansas Rules of Civil 
Procedure, however, filing the complaint alone does not necessarily ‘commence’ the lawsuit.  That filing 
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filed it in federal court.44 Once in federal court, at class certification, a major question would be 
to what extent, if any, the federal judge could call upon or properly be influenced by Ohio state-
court, class-action decisions considering class certification under Ohio Rule 23 and applying (or 
not) Ohio’s substantive law to multi-state classes.  After all, class certification is a procedural 
question under Federal Rule 23, and, as a procedural question, the U.S. Supreme Court’s Erie 
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins45 decision – generally directing that federal courts in diversity cases (which 
multi-state class actions are) must apply state substantive law but are directed to apply federal 
procedural law46 – arguably requires the federal judge to consider only federal jurisprudence, 
since class certification is a procedural, not a substantive, inquiry.   
But can’t it be argued that determining what state’s substantive law applies to classwide 
claims really is, in a way, a substantive question to be decided under the forum state’s 
jurisprudence, thus permitting the federal judge to consider and apply state law, whether the 
forum state’s or some other’s, when deciding predominance under Federal Rule 23?47 And if so, 
 
‘commences’ the lawsuit only if process is served within 90 days thereafter.  Otherwise (i.e., if more than 90 days 
passes), the lawsuit does not ‘commence’ until service of process occurs. . . .”); Eufaula Drugs, Inc. v. 
Scripsolutions, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24821, at *12-13 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 6, 2005) (Remanding pre-CAFA case to 
state court even though plaintiff filed its amended complaint after CAFA’s enactment, explaining that “the Amended 
and Restated Complaint would relate back [and that] this case was commenced for purposes of the CAFA before the 
effective date of the CAFA.”). 
44 See 28 U.S.C. §1332(a) (2005) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the 
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . 
Citizens of different States. . . .”).  See also supra Part II. 
45 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
46 Id. at 78 (“Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in 
any case is the law of the State.”). See infra Part V. 
47 See, e.g., Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 672 (7th Cir. 1981) (“Our inquiry into the predomination analysis must[, in 
part,] be on the substantive elements of plaintiffs’ cause of action and inquire into the proof necessary for the 
various elements.”); Murray v. America’s Mortgage Banc, Inc., Nos. 03 C 5811, 03 C 6816, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
11751, at *9 (N.D. Ill. May 5, 2005) (“The predominance factor requires consideration of the substantive elements 
of the plaintiffs’ cause of action.”); In re Tri-State Crematory Litig., 215 F.R.D. 660, 691 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (“[T]he 
Court will begin its predominance analysis by setting forth the elements of the substantive law for each cause of 
action.”); In re. Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 209 F.R.D. 251, 263 (D.D.C. 2002) (“[T]he predominance inquire also 
requires the identification of the elements of the substantive law at issue.”); Ploog v. Homeside Lending, Inc., No. 
00 C 6391, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15697, at *22 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2001) (“In determining whether the 
predominance requirement has been met, the ‘Court considers the substantive elements of the Plaintiff’s cause of 
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does the fact that the federal court is considering what state’s substantive law to use necessarily 
render this inquiry substantive even though the court is conducting a larger procedural analysis?   
In this manner, might a court’s procedural, federal, class-action analysis be allowed a 
“substantive twist,” specifically where predominance under Federal Rule 23(b)(3) (i.e., which 
state or states’ substantive law should apply) is concerned?  And if so, does considering state-
court, class-action decisions run afoul of Erie, or is making a substantive inquiry when 
conducting a larger procedural one a necessary part of a new CAFA-nated, class-action analysis 
under Erie?48 Let’s find out. 
 
IV.   THE FALLACY OF RELYING EXCLUSIVELY ON STATE 
CHOICE-OF-LAW JURISPRUDENCE 
 
When attempting to resolve this conundrum, the temptation might exist to rely 
principally, if not exclusively, on state choice-of-law jurisprudence and the U.S. Supreme 
 
action, the proof necessary for the various elements, and the manageability of the trial on these issues.’”); Ingram v. 
Coca-Cola Co., 200 F.R.D. 685, 700 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (“[The p]redominance requirement focuses on the substantive 
aspects of class members’ legal claims. . . .”); Panache Broad. v. Richardson Elecs., No. 90 C 6400, 1995 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 14462, at *38 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 1995) (“[A] court should begin the predominance inquiry by focusing on 
the substantive elements of the cause of action, and then examine the evidence necessary to prove those elements in 
order to determine whether common or individual questions are likely to predominate in the litigation.”). 
48 Or perhaps state-court Rule 23 decisions considering what state’s substantive law to apply are sufficiently 
procedural such that they can necessarily be used according to Erie, just like state courts frequently used Federal 
Rule 23 decisions when considering class certification under their state Rule 23 or equivalent procedural statute.  
See, e.g., Southwestern Refining Co., Inc. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425, 433 (Tex. 2000) (“[Texas Rule 42] is patterned 
after Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23; consequently, federal decisions and authorities interpreting current federal 
class action requirements are persuasive authority.”); Echevarria, McCalla, Raymer, Barrett & Frappier v. Cole, 896 
So. 2d 773, 777 (Fla. Ct. App. 2004) (“The federal cases on the issue are persuasive, because Florida [R]ule 1.220, 
which governs certification of a class, is modeled on [F]ederal [R]ule 23, which is interpreted in the above federal 
cases.”); In re Logan, No. 47301-8-I, 2002 Wash. App. LEXIS 475, at *11 (Mar. 11, 2002) (“Federal Rule 23 and 
Washington CR 23 are the same.  ‘[T]hus, federal cases interpreting the analogous federal provision are highly 
persuasive.’”); CSX Transp. v. Clark, 646 N.E.2d 1003, 1007 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (“Federal class action cases 
decided under Federal Rule 23 are persuasive authority for Indiana Courts interpreting Ind. Trial Rule 23.”); Sisters 
of St. Mary v. Aaer Sprayed Insulation, No. 85CV5952, 1987 Wisc. App. LEXIS 4440, at *11 n.8 (Dec. 17, 1987); 
(“[O]ur courts have relied on Federal Rule 23 and federal cases addressing it to approve of procedural 
determinations made by Wisconsin trial courts in class action cases.”); Perry v. Meek, 618 P.2d 934, 940 (Okla. Ct. 
App. 1985) (“Insofar as the issues under consideration arise from provisions of 12 O.S. Supp. 1979 §§13-18, which 
are actually similar to the provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the federal case law on those points is 
instructive persuasive authority in this forum.”); Williams v. Motorists Ins. Corp., No. 76 CA 148, 1977 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 10012, at *11 (Aug. 12, 1977) (“As to the law that would apply in the instant case, it is helpful to resort to 
federal cases dealing with a similar rule, Federal Rule 23.”).  This query, though, is one for another article. 
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Court’s Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., Inc.49 decision, where the Court 
considered whether, in a diversity case, “the federal courts must follow conflict of laws rules 
prevailing in the states in which they sit.”50 Explaining that Erie’s scope extended “to the field 
of conflict of laws,”51 the Klaxon Court ruled that “[t]he conflict of laws rules to be applied by 
the [sitting] federal court . . . must conform to those prevailing in [the forum state’s] state 
courts.”52 
In the relatively infrequent occurrence where a federal court, pre-CAFA, was asked to 
consider multi-state class certification – because, for instance, diversity existed and the requested 
injunctive relief was considered as meeting or exceeding the jurisdictional amount in 
controversy53 – federal courts, as first suggested by Allstate and later by Shutts, sometimes 
invoked Klaxon to conclude that the forum state’s choice-of-law rules applied pursuant to which 
these courts could blithely rule that one state’s substantive law applied to the controversy: 
If a conflict of law is found to exist in this [multi-state, class-action] litigation, 
this Court, sitting in diversity, is bound to apply the choice of law rules of the 
forum state, New York.  [Citing Klaxon] In the event that a conflict of 
substantive law did exist . . . New York courts apply a “center of gravity” or 
 
49 313 U.S. 487 (1941). 
50 Id. at 494. 
51 Id. at 496. 
52 Id.   
53 See, e.g., Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 860 (9th Cir. 2001) (Explaining that federal jurisdiction 
exists in cases where “it is apparent that injunctive relief is the primary relief sought.”); Steinberg v. Nationwide 
Mutual Ins. Co., 224 F.R.D. 67, 71 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (“[T]he injunctive relief sought by the plaintiff furnishes the 
basis for federal jurisdiction.”); Jackson v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22329, at *15 (W.D. 
Tenn. Apr. 3, 2001) (Denying plaintiffs’ motion for remand because they “were seeking injunctive relief in the form 
of the medical monitoring program[, and t]he amount in controversy, therefore, was measured by the value of the 
object of litigation.”); Hubbard v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 95 Civ. 4362, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6974, at *8 
(S.D.N.Y. May 22, 1996) (“The Court finds that plaintiff and the alleged class members have a common and 
undivided interest in the injunctive and declaratory relief sought herein. Therefore, the jurisdictional amount 
requirement is satisfied if their interests collectively exceed $ 50,000.”); Gibbs v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 
876 F. Supp. 475, 479 (W.D.N.Y. 1995) (“In a suit for injunctive or declaratory relief, the amount in controversy is 
measured by the value of the object of the litigation. [Citation omitted.]  The value of the medical monitoring 
program sought by plaintiffs is well in excess of $50,000, even using defendants’ figures.”). 
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“grouping of contracts” test . . . and apply “the law of the jurisdiction having the 
greatest interest in the litigation.”54 
But conducting merely a traditional choice-of-law analysis and deciding whether or not 
predominance is satisfied under the forum state’s substantive law fails to consider the larger 
procedural overlay that federal courts must appreciate when analyzing what is undeniably a 
procedural question under Federal Rule 23.  A shorthand analytical approach under Klaxon 
ignores Erie and its progeny and their generally understood directive to consider federal law with 
respect to procedural matters and state law with respect to substantive ones; although, a Federal 
Rule 23 predominance analysis may well be a substantive matter, just not entirely.55 
Moreover, conducting solely an Allstate/Shutts analysis, and determining “that for a 
State’s substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that State must 
have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that 
choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair,”56 also undermines, and indeed 
entirely neglects, any meaningful procedural analysis.  To merely contemplate the substantive 
choice-of-law issues raised by Allstate and Shutts, while ignoring the procedural realities that a 
Rule 23 predominance analysis necessarily engenders, likewise ignores the Supreme Court’s 
 
54 Steinberg, supra note 53, at 78 (suggesting that applying New York substantive law to multi-state claims when 
conducting Federal Rule 23’s predominance inquiry was appropriate).  See also Simon v. Philip Morris, Inc., 124 F. 
Supp. 2d 46, 70 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (“The significant contacts with New York state in this [multi-state, class-action] 
case satisfy Due Process and Full Faith and Credit under Shutts.”); Gruber v. Price Waterhouse, 117 F.R.D. 75, 82 
(E.D. Pa. 1987) (Finding selection of forum law constitutional in securities litigation where defendant “Pennsylvania 
ha[d] the most significant relationship . . . since the financial statements alleged to contain the misstatements 
emanated from Pennsylvania.”); In re ORFA Sec. Litig., 654 F. Supp. 1449, 1455 (D.N.J. 1987) (“[I]t is clear that 
New Jersey law applie[d] to the questions raised by Count V of the Complaint” because defendant’s principle place 
of business was New Jersey and its alleged misrepresentations originated there.); In re Lilco Sec. Litig., 111 F.R.D. 
663, 670 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (“After Shutts it is not at all certain that application in this case of one state’s law is 
unconstitutional and in the event New York is applied, it may be that New York choice of law rules direct the 
application of New York law.”); In re Activision Sec. Litig., 621 F. Supp. 415, 430-31 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (“Court . . . 
entertain[ed] a presumption that California law . . . control[ed the] case” because defendant maintained its principle 
place of business there, issued securities there, and the purchasers’ acceptances were directed there.). 
55 See generally note 54. 
56 Allstate, supra note 31, at 312-13. 
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long-standing Erie doctrine in favor of another analytically short-shrift choice-of-law approach 
when considering multi-state, class-action litigation and a single state law’s substantive 
application.    
 
V.   ERIE AND ITS PROGENY 
 
Examining Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins57 and its progeny provides some better and more 
complete guidance concerning federal courts’ ability to invoke state-law jurisprudence when 
considering multi-state, class-action claims and applying a single state’s substantive law. 
 
A.   The Erie Doctrine 
In Erie, an object protruding from an Erie freight train injured Tompkins, a Pennsylvania 
resident, while he was walking in Pennsylvania along a commonly used beaten footpath that ran 
alongside the railroad tracks.58 When Tompkins brought his claim in New York federal court, 
because Erie was incorporated there,59 Erie contended that under Pennsylvania law, “its duty to 
Tompkins was no greater than that owed to a trespasser.”60 For Tompkins’ part, he “denied that 
any such rule had been established by the decisions of the Pennsylvania courts; and contended 
that, since there was no statute of the State on the subject, the railroad’s duty and liability [was] 
to be determined in federal courts as a matter of general law,” which favored Tompkins.61 “The 
question for decision,” explained the Court, was “whether the oft-challenged doctrine of Swift v. 
Tyson shall now be disapproved.”62 
57 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
58 Erie, supra note 45, at 69. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 70. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 69. 
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In Swift v. Tyson,63 the Court had earlier held that federal courts exercising diversity 
jurisdiction, in general jurisprudential matters, weren’t required to apply the states’ unwritten 
laws.  Rather, federal courts were free to exercise independent judgment as to what the states’ 
common law was or should have been: 
[T]he true interpretation of the thirty-fourth section [of the 1789 Judiciary Act] 
limited its application to state laws strictly local, that is to say, to the positive 
statutes of the state, and the construction thereof adopted by the local tribunals, 
and to rights and titles to things having a permanent locality, such as the rights 
and titles to real estate, and other matters immovable and intraterritorial in their 
nature and character.  It never has been supposed by us, that the section did apply, 
or was designed to apply, to questions of a more general nature, not at all 
dependent upon local statutes or local usages of a fixed and permanent operation, 
as, for example, to the construction of ordinary contracts or other written 
instruments, and especially to questions of general commercial law, where the 
state tribunals are called upon to perform the like functions as ourselves, that is, 
to ascertain upon general reasoning and legal analogies, what is the true 
exposition of the contract or instrument, or what is the just rule furnished by the 
principles of commercial law to govern the case.  And we have not now the 
slightest difficulty in holding, that this section, upon its true intendment and 
construction, is strictly limited to local statutes and local usages of the character 
before stated, and does not extend to contracts and other instruments of a 
commercial nature, the true interpretation and effect whereof are to be sought, not 
in the decisions of the local tribunals, but in the general principles and doctrines 
of commercial jurisprudence.  Undoubtedly, the decisions of the local tribunals 
upon such subjects are entitled to, and will receive, the most deliberate attention 
and respect of this Court; but they cannot furnish positive rules, or conclusive 
authority, by which our own judgments are to be bound up and governed.64 
But the Erie Court explained that applying Swift’s doctrine had exposed serious political 
and social defects; Swift’s expected benefits had never accrued; and persistent state courts’ 
questions concerning common law had prevented uniformity: 
[T]he mischievous results of the doctrine had become apparent.  Diversity of 
citizenship jurisdiction was conferred in order to prevent apprehended 
discrimination in state courts against those not citizens of the State.  Swift v. 
Tyson introduced grave discrimination by non-citizens against citizens.  It made 
rights enjoyed under the unwritten “general law” vary according to whether 
 
63 41 U.S. 1 (1842). 
64 Id. at 18-19. 
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enforcement was sought in the state or in the federal court; and the privilege of 
selecting the court in which the right should be determined was conferred upon 
the non-citizen.  Thus, the doctrine rendered impossible equal protection of the 
law.  In attempting to promote uniformity of law throughout the United States, 
the doctrine had prevented uniformity in the administration of the law of the 
State.65 
Accordingly, the Erie Court held that, “Except in matters governed by the Federal 
Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State. . . . 
There is no federal general common law.”66 The Court added that Mr. Justice Holmes, in Black 
& White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co.,67 had articulated 
the “fallacy”68 underlying Swift’s rule: 
The doctrine rests upon the assumption that there is “a transcendental body of law 
outside of any particular State but obligatory within it unless and until changed 
by statute,” that federal courts have the power to use their judgment as to what 
the rules of common law are; and that in the federal courts “the parties are 
entitled to an independent judgment on matters of general law”: 
 
“but law in the sense in which courts speak of it today does not 
exist without some definite authority behind it. The common law 
so far as it is enforced in a State, whether called common law or 
not, is not the common law generally but the law of that State 
existing by the authority of that State without regard to what it 
may have been in England or anywhere else. . . . 
 
“the authority and only authority is the State, and if that be so, the 
voice adopted by the State as its own [whether it be of its 
Legislature or of its Supreme Court] should utter the last word.”69 
Accordingly, the Court held that, under Pennsylvania law, “the only duty owed to the 
plaintiff was to refrain from wilful or wanton injury,”70 and it “reversed and the case remanded 
 
65 Id. at 74-75 (footnote omitted). 
66 Id. at 78. 
67 276 U.S. 518 (1928). 
68 Erie, supra note 45, at 79. 
69 Id. (quoting Black & White Taxicab Co., supra note 67, at 532-36). 
70 Id. at 80. 
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to it for further proceedings in conformity with [its] opinion.”71 More generally, of course, the 
Erie Court’s discussion and mandate have become understood to mean that “federal courts 
sitting in diversity cases, when deciding questions of ‘substantive’ law, are bound by state court 
decisions as well as state statutes.”72 
B. Erie’s Transformation – Guaranty Trust Co. v. York 
Supreme Court cases considering other various and assorted federal/state-law quandaries 
transformed and reshaped Erie’s original mandate.  Of Erie’s progeny, Guaranty Trust Co. v. 
York73 offers perhaps the most valuable analytical succor, at least for this Article’s purpose.  In 
York, plaintiff-noteholder sued a class-action case in federal court, based on diversity of 
citizenship, alleging breach of trust by defendant for defendant’s alleged failure to protect her 
and other noteholders’ interests.74 The appellate court ruled that the district court was “not 
required to apply the State statute of limitations that . . . govern[ed] like suits in the courts of a 
State where the federal court [was] sitting even though the exclusive basis of federal jurisdiction 
[was] diversity of citizenship.”75 
The Supreme Court’s “concern [was] with the [appellate court’s] holding that the federal 
court in a suit like [that] one [was] not bound by local law.”76 As this concern specifically 
affected the state statute of limitations, the case, the Court believed, “reduce[d] itself to the 
narrow question whether, when no recovery could be had in a State court because the action 
 
71 Id. 
72 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965). 
73 326 U.S. 99 (1945). 
74 Id. at 100. 
75 Id. at 101. 
76 Id. 
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[was] barred by the statute of limitations, a federal court in equity [could] take cognizance of the 
suit because there [was] diversity of citizenship between the parties.”77 
The Court’s analysis underscored Erie’s objective to ensure that where a federal court is 
exercising diversity jurisdiction, the litigation’s outcome in federal court should be substantially 
the same as if tried in state court: 
Is the outlawry [or endorsement], according to State law, of a claim created by 
the States a matter of “substantive rights” to be respected by a federal court of 
equity when that court’s jurisdiction is dependent on the fact that there is a State-
created right, or is such statute of “a mere remedial character,” . . . which a 
federal court may disregard?78 
Withdrawing from Erie’s substantive versus procedural construct, the Court explained 
that “[m]atters of ‘substance’ and matters of ‘procedure’ are much talked about in the books as 
though they define[] a great divide cutting across the whole domain of law.  But, of course, 
‘substance’ and ‘procedure’ are the same keywords to very different problems.”79 The Court 
restated the question it had considered in Erie, focusing no longer on the substantive-procedural 
distinction but rather marking the emergence of its “outcome determinative test”: 
And so the question is not whether a statute of limitations is deemed a matter of 
“procedure” in some sense.  The question is whether such a statute concerns 
merely the manner and the means by which a right to recover, as recognized by 
the State, is enforced, or whether such statutory limitation is a matter of substance 
in the aspect that alone is relevant to our problem, namely, does it significantly 
affect the result of a litigation for a federal court to disregard a law of a State 
that would be controlling in an action upon the same claim by the same parties in 
a State court?80 
77 Id. at 107. 
78 Id. at 107-08. 
79 Id. at 108.  See also Hanna, supra note 72, at 472 (“[A] federal court system . . . carries with it congressional 
power to make rules governing the practice and pleading in those courts, which in turn includes a power to regulate 
matters which, though falling within the uncertain area between substance and procedure, are rationally capable of 
classification as either.”). 
80 York, supra note 73 at 109 (emphasis added). 
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The Court considered it “immaterial whether a statute of limitations [was] characterized 
either as ‘substantive’ or ‘procedural,’”81 as Erie never endeavored to formulate scientific 
terminology.  Rather, Erie expressed a policy touching vitally on the judicial power’s proper 
distribution between state and federal courts.82 And despite lower courts’ sometimes slavish 
adherence to nomenclature, Erie’s intent was to ensure the same result in state and federal courts 
exercising diversity jurisdiction, not to entangle courts with analytical or terminological niceties: 
[T]he intent of [Erie] was to insure that, in all cases where a federal court is 
exercising jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties, 
the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be substantially the same, 
so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in 
a State court.  The nub of the policy that underlies Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins is that  
for the same transaction the accident of a suit by a non-resident litigant in a 
federal court instead of in a State court a block away should not lead to a 
substantially different result.83 
A federal tribunal, explained the Court, did not afford out-of-state litigants another body 
of law.84 Rather, state law is the source of substantive rights enforced by a federal court 
exercising diversity jurisdiction: 
Here we are dealing with a right to recover derived not from the United States but 
from one of the States.  When, because the plaintiff happens to be a non-resident, 
such a right is enforceable in a federal as well as in a State court, the forms and 
mode of enforcing the right may at times, naturally enough, vary because the two 
judicial systems are not identic.  But since a federal court adjudicating a State-
created right solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties is for that 
purpose, in effect, only another court of the State, it cannot afford recovery if the 
right to recover is made unavailable by the State nor can it substantially affect 
the enforcement of the right as given by the State.85 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 112. 
85 Id. at 108-09 (emphasis added). 
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In keeping with its purpose to avoid federal courts reaching different results than would 
otherwise occur in state courts, the Court ruled that the state statute of limitations applied to 
plaintiff’s claim, and it remanded the case for further proceedings.86 
C.   York’s “Outcome-Determinative” Test Modified – Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural 
Electric Cooperative, Inc. 
 
The Court modified its outcome-determinative test thirteen years later in Byrd v. Blue 
Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc.87 The question presented in Byrd was whether “on 
remand the factual issue [of whether plaintiff was an employee or independent contractor was] to 
be decided by the judge or by the jury.”88 Under state law, the judge decided this question, while 
under federal law the jury did.  In deciding this issue, the Court reiterated Erie’s directive that 
“the federal courts in diversity cases must respect the definition of state-created rights and 
obligations by the state courts.”89 It therefore examined state law “to determine whether [the 
particular judge versus jury issue was] bound up with these rights and obligations in such a way 
that its application in the federal court [was] required.”90 
The Court first reiterated York’s outcome-determinative test and acknowledged that it 
broadened Erie:
[C]ases following Erie have evinced a broader policy to the effect that the federal 
courts should conform as near as may be – in the absence of other considerations 
– to state rules even of form and mode where the state rules may bear 
substantially on the question whether the litigation would come out one way in 
the federal court and another way in the state court if the federal court failed to 
apply a particular local rule.91 
86 Id. at 112. 
87 356 U.S. 525 (1958). 
88 Id. at 533. 
89 Id. at 535. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 536-37. 
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But the Court then withdrew slightly from York’s test, explaining that, under certain 
conditions, federal law trumped state law: 
[T]here are affirmative countervailing considerations at work here.  The federal 
system is an independent system for administering justice to litigants who 
properly invoke its jurisdiction.  An essential characteristic of that system is the 
manner in which, in civil common-law actions, it distributes trial functions 
between judge and jury and, under the influence – if not the command – of the 
Seventh Amendment, assigns the decisions of disputed questions of fact to the 
jury.  [Citation omitted]  The policy of uniform enforcement of state-created 
rights and obligations . . . cannot in every case exact compliance with a state rule 
– not bound up with rights and obligations – which disrupts the federal system of 
allocating functions between judge and jury.  [Citation omitted]  Thus the inquiry 
here is whether the federal policy favoring jury decisions of disputed fact 
questions should yield to the state rule in the interest of furthering the objective 
that the litigation should not come out one way in the federal court and another 
way in the state court.92 
The Court believed that “in the circumstances of [that] case the federal court should not 
[have] follow[ed] the state rule,” because it “[could not] be [disputed] that there is a strong 
federal policy against allowing state rules to disrupt the judge-jury relationship in the federal 
courts.”93 As an additional basis for its decision, the Court added that, with respect to the 
litigation’s potentially different outcome based on “whether the issue of immunity [was] decided 
by a judge or jury,”94 it didn’t “think the likelihood of a different result [was] so strong as to 
require the federal practice of jury determination of disputed factual issues to yield to the state 
rule in the interest of uniformity of outcome.”95 
By this wrinkle to York’s outcome-determinative test, the Court required lower federal 
courts to weigh the policies behind the relevant federal and state rules to determine whether a 
substantial possibility exists that different results will occur under federal law.  If the state 
 
92 Id. at 537-38 (emphasis added). 
93 Id. at 538. 
94 Id. at 539 (If plaintiff was considered an employee, he was barred from suing defendant because the workers 
compensation laws provided him an exclusive remedy.). 
95 Id. at 540. 
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practice reflects a weak state policy – one “not bound up” with the underlying state statute – yet 
the federal practice reflects a strong policy – such as the Seventh Amendment’s jury trial 
guarantee – and if no substantial possibility exists that different results will occur by using 
federal law, then the federal practice is preferred.  Finding this test satisfied, the Court reversed 
and remanded the case for a new trial.96 
D. A Return to York – Hanna v. Plumer 
But seven years later, in Hanna v. Plumer,97 the Court swung back Erie and York’s way 
when considering whether to require “service of process . . . in the manner prescribed by state 
law or that set forth in Rule 4(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”98 Synthesizing the 
preceding cases, the Court again acknowledged Erie’s rule that “federal courts sitting in diversity 
cases, when deciding questions of ‘substantive’ law, are bound by state court decisions as well as 
state statutes.”99 It described that York “made it clear that Erie-type problems were not to be 
solved by reference to any traditional or common-sense substance-procedure distinction. . . .”100 
As the Court had explained earlier in Byrd, York’s outcome-determinative test “was never 
intended to serve as a talisman.”101 Instead, York’s message was that “choices between state and 
federal law are to be made not by application of any automatic, ‘litmus paper’ criterion, but 
rather by reference to the policies underlying the Erie rule.”102 
Applying Federal Rule 4(d)(1), the Court reiterated that the natural difference between 
federal and state courts ought not substantively affect a claim just because the claim is pending 
 
96 Id. 
97 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
98 Id. at 461.   
99 Id. at 465. 
100 Id. at 465-66. 
101 Id. at 466-67. 
102 Id. at 467. 
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in federal court.  “Erie and its offspring,” explained the Court, “cast no doubt on the long-
recognized power of Congress to prescribe housekeeping rules for federal courts even though 
some of those rules will inevitably differ from comparable state rules.”103 Rather, federal courts’ 
natural “housekeeping rules” shouldn’t affect the essence of claims brought in federal court, and 
federal courts should avoid inequitably administering state substantive laws merely because 
diversity exists and the claims reside in federal court. 
 
VI.  FEDERAL COURTS’ FREEDOM TO CONSIDER STATE-COURT, 
CLASS-ACTION JURISPRUDENCE 
 
So how does all this concern our current issue, which is whether federal courts, when 
considering multi-state class certification under Federal Rule 23 pursuant to a single state’s 
substantive law, may rely on state-court, class-action decisions either supporting or denying 
single-state-law application.  After all, myriad state-law decisions exist upon which federal 
judges can potentially draw when considering the multi-state class-certification issues that state-
court judges had previously decided for years.104 
Given that Federal Rule 23 is, of course, a procedural rule, analyzing this question 
exclusively under Erie encourages solely applying federal decisions when deciding class 
certification.  But as we know, class certification, particularly when considering a single state 
law’s substantive application under Federal Rule 23’s predominance requirement, isn’t entirely a 
procedural undertaking – various courts’ Klaxon analyses, which analyze and apply states’ 
substantive laws, confirm this.105 
103 Id. at 473. 
104 See supra note 22. 
105 See, e.g., Coghlan v. Wellcraft Marine Corp., 240 F.3d 449, 452 n.2 (5th Cir. 2001) (analyzing substantive, state 
choice-of-law question under Klaxon ); Zinser v. Accufix Research Institute, Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 
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Rather, state laws undeniably create the claims upon which most multi-state, class-action 
lawsuits are based, whether involving consumer fraud,106 deceptive trade practices,107 breach of 
contract,108 unjust enrichment,109 or some other state-law statutory or common-law claim.   In 
this manner, state laws and their application can’t help but to “significantly affect the result of a 
litigation,”110 since federal lawsuits based on diversity jurisdiction necessarily involve state-law 
claims.  Accordingly, neglecting state law, either substantive or sometimes procedural, would 
preclude federal courts from fully and properly deciding multi-state, class-action claims under a 
single state’s substantive law.  
 
2001) (same); Kirkpatrick v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 827 F.2d 718, 725 n.6 (11th Cir. 1987) (same); Appalachian Ins. 
Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 56, 60 n.10 (3rd Cir. 1982) (same). 
106 See, e.g., Spector v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 12 A.D.3d 358, 359 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (Class-action, consumer-fraud 
claim against Toys “R” Us involving claim “where gift receipts were presented upon an item being returned, the 
person presenting it would receive an amount less than that paid for the item.”); Small v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 252 
A.D.2d 1, 5 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (Class-action, consumer-fraud case for allegedly “deceiv[ing consumers] into 
becoming smokers because defendants lied about nicotine’s addictive properties while secretly manipulating the 
nicotine content of their products in order to addict consumers.”); Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp., 191 Cal. App. 
3d 605, 619-20 (1987) (Class-action, consumer-fraud claim for Sprint allegedly “charg[ing] for incompleted calls.”).  
107 See, e.g., Bally Total Fitness Corp. v. Jackson, 53 S.W.3d 352 (Tex. 2001) (Class-action, deceptive trade 
practices claim alleging that Bally’s “was liable under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act for unconscionable 
conduct and for representing that [its member] agreement[s] conferred rights and obligations prohibited by law.”); 
Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. v. Porcher, 898 So. 2d 153, 156 (Fla. Ct. App. 2005) (Class-action, deceptive 
trade practices claim “alleg[ing] that Chase ha[d] a deliberate policy of failing to post mortgage payments on the 
same date they were received so that it can charge unwarranted late fees.”); J.M. Smucker Co. v. Rudge, 877 So. 2d 
820, 821 (Fla. Ct. App. 2004) (Class-action, deceptive trade practices claim “alleging that Smucker’s Simply 100% 
Fruit products [didn’t] contain 100% fruit.”). 
108 See, e.g., Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 216 Ill. 2d 100, 110 (2005) (Class-action, breach-of-contract 
claim against State Farm disputing “the propriety of State Farm’s uniform practice of specifying the use of non-
OEM crash parts to repair its policyholders’ cars in every instance in which such cheaper parts are available.”); 
Discover Bank v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 36 Cal. 4th 148, 154 (2005) (Class-action, breach-of-contract 
claim against Discover Bank for allegedly “breach[ing] its cardholder agreement by imposing a late fee of 
approximately $29 on payments that were received on the payment due date, but after Discover Bank’s undisclosed 
1:00 p.m. ‘cut-off time.’”); Carolla v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., No. A03-0021, 2003 Minn. App. LEXIS 1109, at 
*2 (Sept. 9, 2003) (Class-action, breach-of-contract claim “asserting that the value of [plaintiff’s] car was 
diminished as a result of being in an accident and that American Family’s Minnesota Family Car Policy covered that 
diminished-value loss.”). 
109 See, e.g., Ortiz v. Ford Motor Co., 909 So. 2d 479, 480 (Fla. Ct. App. 2005) (Class-action, unjust-enrichment 
claim “alleging [that plaintiff] overpaid for his 1998 Ford Explorer beyond its true value due to the Defendant’s 
concealment of a design defect.”); Baltimore Football Club, Inc. v. Superior Court, 171 Cal. App. 3d 352, 356 
(1985) (Class-action, unjust-enrichment action where class asserted “claims of unjust enrichment from the use of 
season ticket purchase money during a year in which games were cancelled due to the strike.”); Boldt v. 
Correspondence Mgmt., 320 N.J. Super. 74, 77 (1999) (Class-action, unjust-enrichment claim for “alleged 
photocopying overcharges by health care providers. . . .”). 
110 York, supra note 73, at 109. 
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Erie made clear that state substantive law had a significant place in federal courts’ legal 
analyses.  Indeed, York confirmed that federal courts may not disregard state law as explicated in 
state-court decisions.  After all, if Erie’s intent was to ensure the same substantive result in 
federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction as in state courts, and state law is the source from 
which all substantive rights enforced by federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction derive, no 
more authoritative source for state law exists than state-court decisions, including state-court 
decisions considering a single state law’s substantive application under state class-action rules.   
Moreover, considering state-court, class-action decisions advances Erie and its progeny’s 
directive that a lawsuit’s outcome remains substantially the same despite the court in which the 
lawsuit is pending.  And although Byrd scaled back York’s outcome-determinative test, 
explaining that uniformly applying state-created rights and obligations (here, state-law, class-
action decisions interpreting and applying state substantive law) needn’t apply where these state 
laws are “not bound up with the [state] rights and obligations” sought to be invoked, state-court, 
class-action decisions can fairly be considered as bound up with – or essential to – state class-
action rules’ fundamental purposes since, in light of these rules’ purposes, state-court, class-
action decisions considered, interpreted, and applied these state class-action rules from the time 
these rules were enacted.  Moreover, acceding to state-court decisions doesn’t risk disrupting or 
otherwise offending the federal system, as occurred in Byrd since almost all state class-action 
statutes mirror Federal Rule 23.111 
111 See, e.g., ARIZ. ST. R. CIV. P. 23 (2005); ARK. R. CIV. P. 23 (2005); FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.220 (2005); IND. R. CIV.
P. 23 (2005); KY. CIV. R. 23.01, 23.02 (2005); ME. R. CIV. P. 23 (2005); MASS. R. CIV. P. 23 (2005); MI. CT. R. 
3.501 (2005); MINN. R. CIV. P. 23.01, 23.02 (2005); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 901 (McKinney 2005); OHIO R. CIV.
P. 23 (2005); PA. R. CIV. P. 1702 (2005); TENN. R. CIV. P. 23.01, 23.02 (2005); TEX. R. CIV. P. 42; VT. R. CIV. P. 
23 (2005) (all mirroring Federal Rule 23 and its prerequisites). 
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Viewed from the opposite end, using federal class-action decisions alone isn’t so bound 
up in Federal Rule 23’s predominance analysis – like, for example, the right to a jury trial is in 
the Constitution112 – that state-court jurisprudence considering predominance should be 
abandoned, especially considering the near, if not complete, identity between most states’ class-
action rules and Federal Rule 23.113 To be sure, no “strong federal policy”114 exists against 
federal courts using state-court, class-action decisions when analyzing the identical 
predominance inquiry and single state law’s classwide application that had been, until recently, 
all but exclusively considered in state courts.  And a predominance inquiry’s outcome may differ 
based on the influence of the state-court decisions invoked versus the relatively scant federal 
authority on this newly developing subject, which is yet another basis Byrd suggested for 
invoking state substantive law and, accordingly, state-court decisions. 
As suggested by Hanna, the fact that interstate, class-action claims are now federalized 
shouldn’t substantively affect these claims’ determination.  Even though state and federal courts 
aren’t identical, federal courts should avoid ignoring or inequitably administering state laws 
merely because CAFA now confers original federal-court, subject-matter jurisdiction on 
interstate, class-action claims.  Rather, federal courts’ adherence to state-court, class-certification 
jurisprudence advances Erie and its progeny’s age-old pronouncements and helps ensure that 
now federalized state-court claims will be decided substantially the same in federal court – their 
new forum – as they had traditionally been decided in state court.  
And finally, as a practical matter, absent state-law consideration, federal courts sitting in 
diversity – many of which will imminently be considering this issue for the first time – will lack 
 
112 Byrd, supra note 87, at 540. 
113 See supra note 111. 
114 Byrd, supra note 87, at 538. 
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significant guidance concerning application of a single state’s substantive law to multi-state 
claims.  To abandon years of well-developed, state-court jurisprudence forces busy and newly 
challenged federal judges to analyze this issue from a largely blank federal slate, surely an 
undesirable consequence115 and one that hardly comports with the judiciary’s obvious and 
fundamental interest to adjudicate claims – especially class-action claims – judiciously, 
efficiently, and economically.116 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 Whether to apply a single state’s substantive law when considering predominance under 
Federal Rule 23 necessarily traverses the substantive and procedural divide, and this query’s 
unique nature evokes Erie’s fundamental essence.  But examining Erie and its progeny (perhaps 
even alongside Klaxon, Allstate, and Shutts) demonstrates that federal courts may, in fact, 
consider state-court decisions when deciding multi-state class certification alleging a single state 
law’s substantive application.  Indeed, considering state-court jurisprudence respects Erie’s 
original mandate while embracing its progeny’s amplifications and nuances. 
And although this issue is merely of the many still to come from CAFA’s recent 
enactment, as federal, multi-state, class-action lawsuits move toward class certification, it is an 
issue sure to receive significant attention.  Erie and its progeny, although never contemplating 
their invocation in this new world order, nonetheless demonstrate the appropriateness of 
invoking state-law, class-action jurisprudence in federal class-certification proceedings 
 
115 See, e.g., Local Union No. 12004, USW v. Massachusetts, 377 F.3d 64, 77 (1st Cir. 2004) (expressing discomfort 
with “decid[ing an] issue on a blank slate”); Visser v. Magnarelli, 542 F. Supp. 1331, 1338 (N.D.N.Y. 1982) 
(emphasizing the importance of precedent so as to avoid “dedid[ing issues] on a tabula rasa”). 
116 See, e.g., Carson v. Polley, 689 F.2d 562, 585 (5th Cir. 1982) (“District courts are entitled to manage their cases 
with the aim of conducting litigation efficiently.”); Lowth v. Town of Cheektowaga, No. 94-CV-0486E(F), 1997 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5589, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 1997) (acknowledging plaintiffs “logical – indeed laudable – 
desire to litigate their claims as efficiently as possible”); Gabelli v. Sikes Corp., No. 90 Civ. 4904 (JMC), 1990 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 17015, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 1990) (acknowledging “the desire to avoid piecemeal litigation and 
promote judicial economy”). 
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considering a single state law’s substantive application.  Federal courts deciding multi-state class 
certification under Federal Rule 23, therefore, are invited to sit back and drink in state-court, 
class-action jurisprudence involving, analyzing, and determining single state laws’ substantive 
application in today’s CAFA-nated world.  
